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RESOLVING RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENTS: 
EVIDENCE AND BIAS
Katherine Dormandy
Resolving religious disagreements is difficult, for beliefs about religion tend 
to come with strong biases against other views and the people who hold 
them. Evidence can help, but there is no agreed-upon policy for weighting it, 
and moreover bias affects the content of our evidence itself. Another compli-
cating factor is that some biases are reliable and others unreliable. What we 
need is an evidence-weighting policy geared toward negotiating the effects 
of bias. I consider three evidence-weighting policies in the philosophy of re-
ligion and advocate one of them as the best for promoting the resolution of 
religious disagreements.
I. Introduction
In response to theological contentions in the Church of England, Arch-
bishop Justin Welby addressed the General Synod in 2014 with a plea 
for “good disagreement.” Welby was mainly encouraging tolerance—he 
took disagreement as a foregone conclusion. But we needn’t always do 
this; another aspect of good disagreement is the search for resolution. By 
“resolution” I mean agreement on a truth, not just on what both parties 
agree is a truth.
In a disagreement, which I’ll understand for simplicity as one party be-
lieving that p and the other believing that ~p (or a proposition that entails 
~p), at least one party believes a falsehood. Of course, neither thinks that it 
is their view. But regardless of who is right, both stand to gain from trying 
to resolve their disagreement. If they succeed, the advantage is most ob-
vious for the person with the false belief: she acquires a true one, along 
with some reasons for it. But the person with the true belief also stands 
to benefit, for she may be challenged to better understand the reasons for 
and against her view. Unsuccessful attempts at resolution can have this 
effect too.1
Disagreements about religion—which can arise between atheists and 
theists, adherents of different religions, and (as in Welby’s case) within a 
single denomination—do not lend themselves to resolution. One reason 
1Anderson, “Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity”; Solomon, Social Empiricism, 
chs. 5 and 6; Longino, The Fate of Knowledge.
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is that beliefs about religion are enmeshed in large-scale worldviews in 
which people are personally, socially, and existentially invested. As a 
result, people often have strong biases—even when they don’t realize 
it—both for their own view and the people who share it, as well as against 
the view of their disagreeing interlocutor and indeed that interlocutor her-
self. Although the term “biased” has negative connotations, biases can be 
truth-conducive as well as truth-detracting.2 But either way they promote 
entrenchment in one’s own view and impede resolution.
How can two parties interested in resolving a religious disagreement 
deal with the effects of bias? A natural suggestion is to heed their evidence. 
This is a good start, but more is needed. Evidence does not typically come 
with ready-made instructions about how to weight it, for much evidence 
is non-deductive: think of a jury weighing evidence for and against a 
verdict. On top of this, biases affect the ways in which we are naturally 
disposed to weight our evidence, as well as the content of the beliefs and 
experiences comprising it. These effects are compounded when the topic 
at issue is something as personally involving as religion.
So attention to evidence is only part of the story. If we are to resolve 
a religious disagreement, we need a policy for weighting our evidence, 
and that policy must negotiate the epistemic effects of bias. This paper 
seeks an evidence-weighting policy to perform this task. To this end I 
tap into the philosophy-of-religion debate on evidence-weighting. This 
debate is geared toward disagreements between theists and atheists, but 
it is generalizable. It can be read, I argue, as concerning whether to avoid 
unreliable biases about religion or foster reliable ones. One view, which I 
call impartialism, recommends ascribing the greatest evidential weight to 
evidence that meets criteria drawn from scientific reasoning and is thus 
less likely to be affected by unreliable bias.3 A second view, which I call 
partialism, recommends giving greater weight instead to certain forms 
of evidence that fall short of these criteria and can thus be expected to 
exhibit reliable and unreliable biases alike.4 The third view, which I call 
egalitarianism, recommends weighting both kinds of evidence about the 
same.5 Can any view deliver what we need to negotiate bias in resolving 
religious disagreements? I’ll argue that egalitarianism is the best suited 
to the task.
Section II defends the epistemic aim of resolving disagreements and 
shows how bias complicates matters. Section III discusses some features 
of disagreements specifically about religion. Section IV outlines the two 
2Antony, “Saulish Skepticism.”
3Locke, Essays; Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt; Martin, Atheism; Philipse, God in the 
Age of Science?; Mackie, The Miracle of Theism.
4Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief; Alston, Perceiving God; Gellman, “Contented 
Religious Exclusivism”; Moser, Evidence for God; Evans, “Religious Experience”; Tucker, 
“Phenomenal Conservatism.”
5Swinburne, Faith and Reason and Existence of God; Greco, “Is Natural Theology Neces-
sary”; Wainwright, “Religious Experience and Religious Pluralism.”
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different types of evidence about religion. Section V outlines the three ev-
idence-weighting policies in the literature, section VI adjudicates among 
them, and section VII concludes.
II. Resolution, Evidence, and Bias
Engaging in disagreement can have many laudable epistemic aims, but 
I’ll focus on resolution. Resolution entails consensus but goes beyond it—
for consensus can be about a falsehood, whereas resolution, in the sense 
at issue here, achieves mutual true belief. Resolution is a long-term goal 
that will often, at least in religious disagreements, remain unreached. But 
both parties stand to benefit epistemically in attempting it, for disagreeing 
interlocutors are well placed to provide insight into the strengths and 
weaknesses of each other’s positions.6 This is so regardless of whether 
the parties are epistemic peers. If they are, their disagreement has the po-
tential to be epistemically fruitful, but perhaps harder to resolve. If the 
parties consist instead in an epistemic “inferior” and “superior,” their 
disagreement might in some cases be easier to resolve, but even when 
unresolved, each stands to learn something from the other. For example, 
both can improve their understanding of the evidence: the one by newly 
grasping it, the other by articulating it clearly to someone unfamiliar with 
it and inclined to disagree.
Some might hesitate to call resolution a universal epistemic good, for 
it can be serendipitous, resting on false or ill-founded assumptions which 
a measure of irresolution is often needed to challenge.7 This objection is 
correct as far as it goes. But the response is not to discard resolution as 
an epistemic aim altogether. If a disagreement goes unresolved, then one 
party remains mistaken in perpetuity, even if other aspects of her dis-
senting view are correct. Hence resolution is an epistemic good, but the 
goodness of a particular resolution admits of degree along a variety of 
dimensions.
Heeding evidence is one way to approach the aim of resolution (there 
may be others). No policy for weighting evidence can guarantee resolu-
tion, but it can optimize the use of evidence in moving both parties closer 
toward it. I’ll understand evidence8 as the content of a person’s represen-
tational experiences9 and of her evidence-proportioned beliefs (the latter 
6Basinger (in Religious Diversity) even argues that attempting to resolve religious disagree-
ments is sometimes epistemically obligatory; cf. McKim, On Religious Diversity; Anderson, 
“Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity”; Solomon, Social Empiricism, chs. 5 and 6.
7Solomon, Social Empiricism, chs. 5 and 6.
8This standard view of evidence is articulated in Conee and Feldman, Evidentialism (cf. 
Dougherty, Evidentialism and Its Discontents; Dougherty, “Faith”). It encompasses what Plant-
inga (Warranted Christian Belief) calls “evidence” and “grounds.” It is internalist, though my 
argument can probably be made compatible with externalist constraints on evidence, e.g., 
Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits. 
9“Representational experience” is construed broadly, to include sensory or emotional 
experiences, intellectual seemings, etc. Memories are evidence, too, but space prohibits dis-
cussing them separately.
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being determined, of course, by the operative evidence-weighting policy). 
I’ll call the former experiential and the latter propositional. Evidence is re-
stricted to representational content, because only this presents things as 
being one way rather than another way.10 Evidence-weighting policies have 
the function of helping people achieve epistemic aims. Because people are 
cognitively and environmentally situated, an evidence-weighting policy 
must be sensitive to the situational features that promote or impede the 
epistemic aims that it is supposed to further.11
When our epistemic aim is to resolve a religious disagreement, an im-
portant situational feature to take account of is bias. A bias is an agent’s 
mental association between a type of object or person, and a valenced 
property or feeling.12 One might for example associate beaches with 
happiness, spiders with disgust, or BMWs with prestige. Bias disposes 
agents, but does not determine them, to cognize in certain ways before 
they receive any evidence. Bias can occur implicitly (i.e., at a less than fully 
conscious level), even when the agent disavows the association.13
How can an evidence-weighting policy geared toward resolution take 
account of bias? The answer is not straightforward, for two reasons. The 
first is that bias affects the very content of our evidence, as well as the way 
that we are disposed to weight it. Bias affects the content of our experiential 
evidence by influencing the things we attend to,14 and by “coloring” our 
perceptions of those things.15 For example, an aversion to spiders disposes 
us to notice spiders (or things that move across the floor like them) and 
to perceive them as dangerous, and an affinity for chocolate disposes us 
to notice confectioneries and to perceive them as inviting. As for bias’s 
influence on the ways in which we are inclined to weight our evidence, 
it disposes us to prefer some beliefs or explanations, given some body 
of evidence, over others.16 For example, if the physical features of our 
new acquaintance, Sam, remind me of my childhood best friend whereas 
they remind you of the neighborhood bully, then I will have positive as-
sociations with Sam, whereas you will have negative ones. So given the 
evidence of Sam’s swerving her car, I will be disposed to believe charitably 
that she was trying not to hit something, whereas you will be disposed to 
believe uncharitably that she is reckless.
One might think that the best way to promote the resolution of dis-
agreements, religious or otherwise, is to minimize the effects of bias 
10I am not assuming that representational content is propositional.
11Antony, “Saulish Skepticism,” 181–182.
12See Vaughan and Hogg, Social Psychology, 49–61; Machery, “De-Freuding”; Holroyd and 
Sweetman, “Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias.”
13Machery, “De-Freuding,” 107–110; Saul, “Skepticism and Implicit Bias,” 246
14Mack and Rock, Inattentional Blindness; Chabris and Simons, The Invisible Gorilla, ch. 1.
15Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 71; Mills, “White Ignorance,” 27; Roberts, “Emotions as Ac-
cess”; Cottingham, Spiritual Dimension, ch. 1; Dougherty, “Faith.”
16Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, parts II and III; Chabris and Simons, The Invisible 
Gorilla, ch. 5.
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altogether. On the one hand, the effects of some biases should indeed be 
minimized, for the function of bias—namely, to help us quickly process 
daunting swathes of information17—is not straightforwardly epistemic; it 
has pragmatic dimensions too.18 For example, you may associate snakes 
with danger. This bias arguably succeeds if it prompts you to avoid the 
dangerous snakes, even if you also believe falsely that harmless snakes 
you encounter (in fact, the vast majority of snakes) are dangerous. An-
other example is status-quo bias, which disposes us to associate goodness 
with social hierarchies.19 This bias arguably functions by sustaining social 
order, even if it also disposes us to believe that justice prevails when it 
does not.20 When a bias disposes us to form more false beliefs than true 
ones (even if in crucial yet occasional cases, like that of poisonous snake, 
we form true ones), I’ll call it epistemically unreliable.21
However—and this brings me to the second reason why matters are not 
straightforward—a bias can also be epistemically reliable: the beliefs that 
it disposes us to form can be mostly true.22 For example, many of us are 
biased to believe what smiling people tell us.23 This often helps us quickly 
form true beliefs: smiling typically indicates a testifier’s good intentions 
toward you, so barring utter epistemic incompetence on his part, what he 
tells you will usually be true. Usually.
The problem is that epistemic reliability is rarely perfect. Biases re-
spond to superficial features of situations without attending to specifics.24 
Reliable biases dispose us to draw conclusions that are probably true, 
yet probability is compatible with falsehood.25 For example, our reliable 
disposition to associate smiling with trustworthy testimony can mis-
lead: smiling testifiers sometimes overestimate their knowledge, and in 
some cultures (so I have heard) it is considered polite to direct a person 
(smilingly) anywhere at all rather than refuse his request for help. I’ll call 
a false belief formed because of an otherwise reliable bias a false-positive 
belief. In simple cases, false-positive beliefs are easily corrected by other 
evidence. But in complex cases they are more recalcitrant. For example, 
17Kahneman Thinking, Fast and Slow, part I.
18Antony, “Saulish Skepticism,” 186–187; De Cruz and De Smedt, “Reformed and Evolu-
tionary Epistemology,” 55–57.
19Hundleby, “Implicit Bias and Fallacies of Argumentation.”
20It is desirable to maintain our knee-jerk fear of snakes, less so our knee-jerk affirmation 
of social hierarchies.
21There is a question concerning which reference class is relevant to determining the reli-
ability of a bias; I don’t have space to discuss this here.
22Gigerenzer, Todd, and ABC Research Group, Simple Heuristics; Antony, “Saulish Skepti-
cism,” 175–184. For an application to religion see Dougherty, “Faith,” 102.
23Vaughan and Hogg, Social Psychology, 45–49.
24Blum, “Stereotypes and Stereotyping,” 258–265 and 271–277; Vaughan and Hogg, Social 
Psychology, 45–61.
25Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness; Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? For application 
to religious beliefs see Clark and Barrett, Reidian Religious Epistemology, and De Cruz and De 
Smedt, “Reformed and Evolutionary Epistemology,” 55–57.
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given the background belief that I have poor orientation, if, when visiting 
the abovementioned culture, I get lost whenever I follow smiling testifiers’ 
directions, I may be apt to conclude that I failed to follow them correctly, 
not that smiling does not correlate with truth in this society. False-positive 
beliefs, then, can be hard to uproot. Most reliable biases are merely roughly 
reliable.
The job of an evidence-weighting policy aimed at promoting resolution 
is thus complex. It must discourage unreliable biases, while encouraging 
reliable ones insofar as they dispose us to true beliefs but not to false-
positive ones. No evidence-weighting policy can perfectly meet these 
demands: policies are general, whereas evidential situations are partic-
ular. But some policies are better than others. In order to adjudicate among 
the three evidence-weighting policies in the literature, let’s consider more 
closely the particular bias-related challenges that arise in religious dis-
agreements.
III. Bias in Religious Disagreement
Biases about religion tend to be especially strong; that is, they tend to re-
sist being overturned by counter-instances. The reason is that our views 
on religion tend to function as a large-scale “worldview,” making sense of 
the world for us. We are apt to be attracted to the sense of coherence that 
our beliefs about religion provide and thus to anything appearing to sup-
port them, and to be repelled by anything appearing to undermine them.26
A religious disagreement presents a person with an interlocutor who 
holds a view about religion that is (at least in some ways) incompatible 
with her own. Especially if the differences are important, she will incline 
toward strong biases against his view and the considerations that he 
adduces to support it. In addition, she will incline toward strong biases 
against him, particularly if they cast aspersion on him as an epistemic 
agent. To see what this amounts to, consider the example of the culturally 
prevalent stereotype of the “dumb blond”; this may prime someone to 
perceive a blond person (especially a woman) as unintelligent, and thus 
to epistemically devalue her arguments and opinion.27 We may contrast 
this epistemic downgrading with the example from section II, in which 
we are prone to epistemically upgrade smiling interlocutors. If we are 
epistemically biased against someone, we are apt to attend to those of her 
features that we associate with a lack of intelligence and to perceive her as 
unintelligent. We may remember her argument as less impressive than it 
really was. And we will be inclined to interpret her argument, or evidence 
about her epistemic credentials, uncharitably. Moreover, we will often not 
realize that we are doing this, thinking instead that we are giving her and 
her arguments a neutral hearing.28
26Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, “Terror Management Theory.”
27Fricker, Epistemic Injustice; Saul, “Scepticism and Implicit Bias,” 248.
28Saul, “Scepticism and Implicit Bias,” 248.
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Systems of worldview beliefs by no means have a monopoly on epis-
temic downgrading. But many have tools that cement epistemic bias. For 
one, many employ concepts with epistemically-valenced overtones. Think 
of notions such as inspired, fundamentalist, scientific, heretical, enlightened, 
or noetically sinful. Consider how these might easily align with categories 
into which you or a disagreeing interlocutor may fall—such as atheist, 
evangelical, Sunni, Orthodox Jew, or non-Christian. Moreover, beliefs about 
religion are often accompanied by error theories explaining outsiders’ 
nonbelief.29 Think of the claim that atheism is scientific whereas belief in 
God arises from unreliable psychological processes,30 or the claim that be-
lief in God is divinely inspired whereas nonbelief comes from the noetic 
effects of sin.31
Such error theories are not ipso facto epistemically problematic. In-
sofar as any belief system is confronted with people who do not share 
it, error theories improve its coherence, and even stand to be true if the 
belief system more generally is. And certain categories are relevant to our 
epistemic assessment of an interlocutor. We want to know, for example, 
whether she is epistemically responsible, prone to distorting biases of 
her own, and whether she is our epistemic peer. An error theory is prob-
lematic mainly insofar as we use it as a “discrediting mechanism” that 
epistemically downgrades disagreeing interlocutors a priori.32 That is, 
an error theory is problematic if you assume that it fully explains every 
disagreement you might encounter, or that it precludes your interlocutor 
from having any insights at all. An evidence-weighting policy geared 
toward resolving religious disagreements, then, must discourage biases 
from turning error theories into discrediting mechanisms.
Moreover, bias can persist implicitly even against interlocutors whom 
one respects personally or intellectually, and even explicit epistemic biases 
can be localized to an interlocutor’s views about religion (e.g., “she’s a 
great logician, but . . . ”). So an evidence-weighting policy has its work cut 
out for it.
IV. Two Types of Evidence about Religion
The philosophy-of-religion debate over evidence-weighting can be framed 
in terms of the proponents’ approaches to bias. On this reading it concerns 
how much weight to accord to evidence designed to be as free as possible 
of religion-related bias, as opposed to evidence that encodes certain biases 
thought to be reliable. I’ll outline the two types of evidence here, and the 
evidence-weighting policies in section V.
29Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure,” 338–340; Lackey, “Taking 
Religious Disagreement Seriously,” 304–307.
30Martin, Atheism, ch. 6.
31Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, ch.7.
32McKim, Religious Ambiguity, 136.
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Impartialist evidence33 is modeled after evidence in science;34 it is de-
signed to be as free as possible of any biases about the matter that the 
evidence concerns. It meets the following necessary conditions:
Intersubjective-Transparency Condition: Propositional evidence is 
impartialist only if any competent person is able to entertain the 
proposition in question. Experiential evidence is impartialist only if any 
competent person would be able, were she in the right place at the right 
time, to undergo the experience (type) in question.35
Non-Question-Beggingness Condition: Propositional evidence is im-
partialist only if it does not beg the question about the matter that it 
concerns.36
The intersubjective-transparency condition applies to propositional and ex-
periential evidence; the non-question-beggingness condition applies only to 
propositional evidence (for experiences, being psychologically prior to 
judgments, are not the kinds of things that can be question-begging). I’ll 
illustrate the conditions with examples from science, and then apply them 
to religion.
Evidence meeting the intersubjective-transparency condition is acces-
sible to all manner of people, including those with mutually conflicting 
biases. Propositional evidence need merely be entertained to be acces-
sible. Scientific examples include statements of experimental results or 
background assumptions. Experiential evidence, by contrast, is strictly 
speaking inaccessible to those who have not had the experience in ques-
tion. For epistemic purposes, however, it suffices that the type of experience 
be repeatable in suitable conditions. Two experiences count as being of the 
same type if they have the same epistemically relevant properties con-
cerning the matter at hand, such as the experience of looking at a type of 
specimen under a microscope. The thought is that repeatable experience-
types will typically be those in which idiosyncratic biases about the matter 
under investigation do not feature.
The intersubjective transparency condition restricts the range of people 
to whom impartialist evidence must be accessible: they must be compe-
tent. We should not, for instance, disqualify the evidence delivered by a 
33I won’t call it “impartial,” because some argue that a view favoring this kind of evidence 
is itself partial to scientific methodology; cf. Moser, Evidence for God, 27; Elusive God, 101–105.
34For example, Philipse (God in the Age of Science?) frames his discussion in terms of the 
“context of discovery” and “context of justification” (14–15), and Schellenberg (Wisdom to 
Doubt) refers to epistemic agents as “investigators” (170). For discussion see Moser, Evidence 
for God, ch. 1; and Cottingham, Spiritual Dimension, ch. 1.
35Scientific reasons are often argued to be “public”; cf. Elgin, True Enough, ch. 5. An analo-
gous condition for evidence about religion is endorsed, for example, by Philipse, God in the 
Age of Science?, part I; Schellenberg, Prolegomena, 160–161, 165; and Locke, Essays, bk. IV, ch. 
18.
36This condition is endorsed for evidence about religion by, for example, Philipse, God in 
the Age of Science?, 14–15; Locke, Essays, bk. IV, ch. 18. 
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particle accelerator on the grounds that non-physicists cannot entertain it. 
One might wonder whether the competence requirement trivializes the 
condition. For competence is determined within a doxastic practice, and 
there seems little to stop a doxastic practice from defining competence as 
it likes. In particular, a practice might define competence as the possession 
of biases favoring a certain conclusion on the matter that the evidence 
concerns. However, claims about competence are themselves a form of ev-
idence, and as we’ll see, the second condition places constraints on them.
The non-question-beggingness condition aims to exclude any assump-
tions that encode bias in favor of a particular hypothesis or conclusion. 
Such assumptions might feature as the premises (or hidden premises) 
of an argument; they can concern the methodology of an investigation, 
or they can be presupposed by the concepts used to frame a problem.37 
Question-begging evidence might presuppose a single, specific, conclu-
sion or outcome (as when an argument uses its conclusion to support a 
premise); or it might be compatible with a range of conclusions while 
foreclosing some specific one (as when an investigation is designed in a 
way that excludes a particular result). Importantly, evidence might beg 
the question by defining competence in terms of an ability to achieve a 
result confirming a specific view. For example: when the matter under in-
vestigation is Mayan geography, it would be question-begging to count an 
archaeologist as competent simply because her bias in favor of a Mayan-
settlement hypothesis disposes her to perceive artifacts from most sites as 
Mayan. Her judgment would be a bad reason to believe that a given site is 
a Mayan settlement. In answer to the above worry that doxastic practices 
may define competence as they please, the non-question-begging condi-
tion ensures that criteria for competence do not favor some conclusions 
over others.
Let’s consider whether evidence-types standardly brought to bear on 
religion count as impartialist.
A salient form of propositional evidence are the premises and con-
clusions of deductive and probabilistic inferences. This evidence is 
intersubjectively transparent to those competent in the relevant logics. 
And it can be non-question-begging: deductive inferences if they avoid 
using their own conclusions as premises or necessary support for prem-
ises, and probabilistic inferences if they assign competing hypotheses the 
same prior probability (unless they offer non-question-begging reasons 
for doing otherwise).38 Inferences, then, can be impartialist evidence.
Let’s turn to religious experiences, which we may understand as any-
thing from full-blown mystical encounters to subdued intimations of 
transcendence in nature. Only the intersubjective-transparency condition 
is relevant here. One might think that religious experiences can meet it, on 
37Longino, The Fate of Knowledge; Anderson, “Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objec-
tivity.”
38Schellenberg (Wisdom to Doubt, 160–161) applies this point to the religious case.
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the grounds that there is a special “mystical competence” for undergoing 
them. But this suggestion is overhasty, for the non-question-beggingness 
condition (as we saw) places constraints on claims about competence. And 
it excludes mystical competence. The reason is that mystical competence 
is a predisposition to have not just any type of religious experience, but 
rather experiences matching the beliefs of a specific religious worldview. 
One would not be regarded as competent in the Christian mystical prac-
tice, for instance, if one had experiences of Poseidon. So the claim that 
one can possess a mystical competence forecloses the possibility that 
people regarded as doing so have experiences confirming any other re-
ligious worldview. But even if a non-question-begging notion of mystical 
competence could be found, religious experiences would still violate the 
intersubjective-transparency condition. For they are not the kinds of ex-
perience that one can have simply by being in the right place at the right 
time.39 At least as they are construed in Western philosophy of religion, 
they are “a matter of divine cognitive grace rather than human meritorious 
earning or even humanly controllable evidence.”40 Religious experiences 
then, do not count as impartialist evidence.41
Beliefs about the occurrence of religious experiences, however, can some-
times count. They do not count when they are of the form “I had that 
experience,” where “that” refers to a phenomenal character accessible 
only to the person who had the experience; for such beliefs fail to meet 
the intersubjective-transparency condition. Nor do beliefs of the form “So-
and-so had an experience of God,” for these presuppose that God exists 
and are thus question-begging. However, beliefs of the form “So-and-so 
had an experience apparently of God” are acceptable. For their content is 
intersubjectively transparent to any linguistically competent hearer, and 
they do not presuppose anything about God’s existence.42
Another source of evidence about religion is testimony, for example 
from parents or scripture. Testimony provides experiential evidence of the 
testifier’s asserting that p, where p is a proposition about religion; it also 
provides the propositional evidence (grounded in this experience) that the 
testifier asserted that p. How do these fare on the impartialist criteria?
The experiential evidence violates the intersubjective-transparency 
criterion. This may come as a surprise: can’t anyone who understands 
the testifier’s language undergo the relevant experience-type? Not the 
epistemically relevant one. Let me explain. Granted, anyone can indeed 
have the coarse-grained experience-type “Testifier t asserts that p.” So 
the experience counts as evidence for the belief that t asserted that p. But 
39Certain experiences can be caused by brain manipulation, but they tend not to be re-
garded as religious.
40Moser, Evidence for God, 30.
41Cf. Schellenberg, Prolegomena, 189; Martin, Atheism, ch. 6; Philipse, God in the Age of Sci-
ence?, ch. 15.
42Cf. Schellenberg, Prolegomena, 160–161.
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when the testimonial experience is individuated more finely, in a way 
that places in relief the properties relevant to whether p is true, it does 
not meet the intersubjective-transparency condition. For these proper-
ties include hard-to-articulate phenomenological properties arising from 
epistemically-laden ways of perceiving the testifier (see section III). When 
the experience-type is individuated this way, not just anyone would have 
the same one. Those inclined to believe that p would tend to experience 
the testifier as epistemically trustworthy, whereas those inclined to disbe-
lieve that p would tend to experience him as epistemically untrustworthy. 
Like religious experiences, testimonial ones are too bias-prone to count as 
impartialist evidence.
However, the propositional evidence that t asserted that p can count as 
impartialist evidence. This meets the intersubjective-transparency condi-
tion (as long as p can be grasped by any linguistically competent person); 
it also meets the non-question-beggingness condition, for the belief that t 
asserted that p does not presuppose the truth of p. We must note, however, 
that beliefs of this form do not speak for or against p on their own; they can 
only do so in conjunction with auxiliary beliefs about the epistemic prop-
erties of t himself. Another way to put this is that impartialist evidence can 
only legitimate inferential testimonial belief.
This brings us to a final salient type of evidence about religion: beliefs 
that feature in inferences about the trustworthiness of testifiers. An ex-
ample is a belief concerning whether a testifier who disagrees with you 
about religion is your epistemic peer. Such a belief meets the intersubjective 
transparency condition as long as the criteria for peerhood can be grasped 
by any competent person. As for the non-question-beggingness condition, 
a belief about peerhood only meets this condition as long as it is not de-
rived from your own views about religion. For example, the belief that 
your interlocutor is not a peer, based on your favorite question-begging 
error theory, does not count as impartialist evidence. So some beliefs about 
peerhood can count as impartialist evidence, but others cannot.
Let’s turn more briefly to the second category of evidence, partialist evi-
dence. Partialist evidence is a subset of the evidence weeded out by the 
two criteria. It includes, particularly, evidence likely to be affected by one’s 
religion-related biases, including emotional tendencies to perceive things 
or testifiers in value-laden ways.43 It includes religious experiences (as 
opposed to mere beliefs about their occurrence). And it includes question-
begging assumptions about the veridicality of a religious experience, the 
trustworthiness or peer status of a testifier, the higher prior probability of 
one hypothesis over another, or question-begging claims about mystical 
competence.44
43Roberts (“Emotions as Access”) and Cottingham (Spiritual Dimension, ch. 1) argue that 
emotions are essential for perceiving religious aspects of reality.
44Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God” and Warranted Christian Belief; Alston, Perceiving 
God; Moser, Evidence for God, ch. 3.
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The idea is that such evidence, though prone to bias about religion, 
can be prone to reliable bias. Accounts vary, but they share the theme that 
reliable biases can be divinely caused and that God may prefer to com-
municate by means of them. For example, Alston argues that a “mystical 
practice” can reliably point to its divine source.45 Plantinga argues that 
non-inferential religious belief on the basis of experiences and testimony 
can be a manifestation of proper cognitive function.46 Moser argues that 
the only “conclusive” evidence for God consists in experiences mediated 
by a person’s conscience.47
The next section presents the three evidence-weighting policies, and 
section VI considers how effectively each policy promotes the resolution 
of religious disagreements.
V. Evidence-Weighting Policies
Evidence-weighting policies are coarse epistemic tools, whereas 
belief-forming situations are extremely fine-grained. Because of this, evi-
dence-weighting policies are not guaranteed to yield the optimal outcome 
across all situations; they are more like rules of thumb. Rules of thumb 
home in on a small number of salient variables and issue a general recom-
mendation that is not guaranteed to perfectly achieve the desired result. 
Because of this they admit of exception but should usually be highly effec-
tive at promoting the aim in question.48
What is evidential weight? As I understand it here, it is a measure of the 
epistemic influence that a piece of evidence should have in determining 
your doxastic attitude toward a given proposition. Consider for example 
two scenarios. In the first, a reliable weather forecaster, Sanchez, predicts a 
95 percent chance of rain. Supposing that you lack other information, this 
evidence arguably justifies a probability assignment to rain of around 95 
percent. In the second scenario, there is in addition to Sanchez a second 
forecaster, Smith, who is less reliable than Sanchez but not wholly unre-
liable, and who predicts a 50 percent chance of rain. Lacking additional 
information, what probability do these forecasts justify together? Arguably 
one somewhere between 95 percent and 50 percent, but skewed closer to 95 
percent. The reason is that Sanchez is more reliable, so her 95 percent pre-
diction should receive greater weight than Smith’s 50 percent prediction: it 
should play a more influential role in forming your doxastic attitude.
Evidential weighting can be modeled in various ways. One example 
follows a three-step procedure.49 First, you assign the proposition in 
45Alston, Perceiving God, ch. 6.
46Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, ch. 8.
47Moser Evidence for God, 182–183.
48Note: I am committed neither to the Uniqueness Thesis nor to its denial; see Feldman, 
“Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” 
49Dougherty (“Zagzebski, Authority, Faith,” 56) uses this method to weight the opinions 
of multiple testifiers with differing degrees of expertise.
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question a conditional probability for each piece of relevant evidence. 
Second, you assign a numeric weight to each of these conditional prob-
abilities; the evidence-weighting polices discussed here do so on the basis 
of whether the evidence is impartialist or partialist. Third, you calculate 
the weighted average of those conditional probabilities. What results is 
the appropriate doxastic attitude given your total evidence. Evidential 
weighting may be modeled in other ways, and an important job for future 
research is to spell this out (see section VI.4).
Let’s turn to the three policies. Impartialism, as we saw, aims to ex-
punge any effects of bias on evidence. For this reason it ascribes the most 
epistemic weight to impartialist evidence and little or no weight to par-
tialist evidence:
Impartialist Evidence-Weighting: In general, when forming beliefs 
about religion, you should give any impartialist evidence that you have 
a good deal of weight and any partialist evidence that you have little 
or no weight.
Atheists tend to endorse impartialism.50 Philipse argues for instance 
that “rational or natural theology has an epistemological priority over 
revelation.”51 But some theists are impartialists too: Locke wants to ensure 
that no partialist “enthusiasm” can influence beliefs about religion.52
Partialists take the opposite approach. They argue that science is the 
wrong model for beliefs about religion and that the impartialist condi-
tions exclude precisely the evidence most apt to yield knowledge or true 
belief about religion.53 Partialism, which tends to correlate positively with 
theism, is best construed as strongly affirming the epistemic value of par-
tialist evidence. A partialist may value impartialist evidence too, as long as 
this value does not extend to requiring agents to give it any non-negligible 
weight.54 Here is the partialist evidence-weighting policy:55
Partialist Evidence-Weighting: In general, when forming beliefs about 
religion, you are permitted to give any partialist evidence that you have 
predominant weight and any impartialist evidence that you have little 
if any weight.
50Martin, Atheism, ch. 6; Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 190; Mackie, The Miracle of 
Theism.
51Philipse, God in the Age of Science?, 5.
52Locke, Essays, Bk. IV, Ch. 19 and Bk. IV, Ch. 18, Sec. 4.
53Moser, Evidence for God, ch. 1 and page 205; Wolterstorff, Inquiring about God, 156; 
Gellman, “Contented Religious Exclusivism,” 410.
54Evans (“Religious Experience”) and Moser (Evidence for God) are both partialists, yet 
Evans affirms, whereas Moser (chs. 1 and 3) disparages, the epistemic value of impartialist 
evidence. Partialism is compatible with minimalist (impartialist) logical constraints (Alston, 
Perceiving God).
55Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief; Alston, Perceiving God; Moser, Evidence for God; 
Wolterstorff, Inquiring about God, ch. 15; Gellman, “Contented Religious Exclusivism”; Evans, 
“Religious Experience”; Tucker, “Phenomenal Conservatism.”
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Partialism differs from impartialism in stating permission rather than ob-
ligation. Although partialists permit the heavy weighting of impartialist 
evidence, they would look askance at religious believers who opted to 
do this.56
Egalitarianism eschews what it sees as the extremes of its competitors. 
It claims that both kinds of evidence have significant drawbacks and sig-
nificant strengths, and that each is therefore required as a complement to 
the other.
Swinburne is an egalitarian. On the one hand, he writes the following:
In an age of religious skepticism when there are good arguments against 
theism known to most people, and there are so often authoritative atheists as 
well as authoritative theists, most theists need arguments for the existence 
of God which start from rightly basic beliefs held very strongly by theist 
and atheist alike, and proceed thence by criteria shared between theist and 
atheist.57
But he also argues that “[o]ne who has had a religious experience appar-
ently of God has good reason for believing that there is a God—other 
things being equal—especially if it is a forceful experience.”58 Wainwright 
is arguably an egalitarian too. He emphasizes the importance of impar-
tialist evidence: “Whether one is committed to a mystical practice or 
not, metaphysical and empirical argumentation of a familiar sort . . . is 
probably needed to show that commitment to [such a practice] is fully 
rational.”59 Yet he suggests that partialist evidence is crucial, too:
There is no reason to think that a person who refuses to allow herself to be 
influenced by her moral and aesthetic proclivities, sentiments, and feelings 
is more likely to arrive at the truth about moral and aesthetic matters than 
someone who doesn’t or, indeed, is even as likely to do so. And in fact the 
contrary seems to be true.60
Greco too can be classed as an egalitarian, arguing that the impartialist 
evidence of natural theology is necessary but insufficient for religious 
knowledge.61
Here is the egalitarian evidence-weighting policy:
Egalitarian Evidence-Weighting: In general, when forming beliefs 
about religion, you should give any impartialist evidence and partialist 
evidence that you have approximately equal weight.
56Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 64–71.
57Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 91.
58Swinburne, Existence of God, 325.
59Wainwright, “Religious Experience,” 224.
60Wainwright, “Theistic Proofs,” 91–92. I take it that religious matters can be classed with 
moral ones.
61Greco, “Is Natural Theology Necessary.”
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Egalitarianism, like impartialism, obligates rather than merely permits. 
This is a consequence of its taking each type of evidence to have important 
strengths that compensate for unfortunate weaknesses in the other.
Like the other views, there is a measure of imprecision in what egalitar-
ianism recommends. It can be construed as licensing some non-inferential 
belief on the basis of experiences or testimony, albeit with a strong sensi-
tivity to defeaters. It legitimates some reliance on one’s prior viewpoint in 
assigning prior probabilities, as long as alternative explanations are still 
taken seriously, and so forth. More than this, egalitarianism requires atten-
tion to all of these considerations, with the impartialist and partialist ones 
complementing and constraining each other.
These three policies concern only evidence that one has. They say 
nothing on their own about what sorts of evidence one should strive to 
have (although we can expect what proponents of each view would say). 
Pending future work on this issue, I will assume in the following that the 
agents in my examples have roughly equal amounts of impartialist and 
partialist evidence and that the quality of each is about the same.
Let’s now adjudicate among these three policies.
VI. Which Policy is Best for Resolving Religious Disagreements?
Disagreements are often construed as involving two competing views.62 
Yet disagreements can also arise among a plurality of viewpoints; indeed, 
the problem of religious disagreement (or diversity) is often framed this 
way.63 I will start, for simplicity, by considering disagreements with only 
two alternatives, but section VI.4 will lift this restriction and consider dis-
agreements among multiple views.
VI.1. Impartialism
The impartialist will claim that, because her view weeds out the evidence 
most prone to the effects of bias, it is well placed to resolve religious dis-
agreements. It prohibits the use of question-begging error theories and 
checks our natural tendency to heavily weight evidence favoring our 
preferred views about religion. The impartialist will grant that her view 
stifles reliable biases along with unreliable ones—but she will plead that 
this is the best alternative, given that religion is so strongly bias-prone in 
both directions. And she will note that there is no shortage of impartialist 
evidence about religion for interlocutors to work with.
But impartialism does its bias-depleting job too well. It leaves us with 
a preponderance of evidence that is largely neutral of religious content, 
often too neutral to decide a question about religion either way. The best 
that agents can usually do, on impartialism, is form tentative or uncertain 
62Bergmann, “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure”; Elga, “Reflection and Dis-
agreement”; Kelly, “Peer Disagreement”; Lackey, “Justificationist View.”
63McKim, Religious Ambiguity; Basinger, Religious Diversity; Philipse, God in the Age of Sci-
ence?; Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt.
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doxastic attitudes hovering around a 50 percent level of confidence.64 A 
fortiori, the best that two disagreeing interlocutors can do is to agree not on 
a true belief about religion (which resolution in the sense at issue requires) 
but on an attitude of uncertainty.
To see why, consider two interlocutors who disagree about whether 
p, a proposition about religion, is true. Frieda is reliably biased and as a 
result believes truly that p. Fred is unreliably biased and as a result be-
lieves (falsely) that not-p. They apply impartialism, hoping to resolve their 
disagreement.
Consider the effect of impartialism on Frieda’s doxastic state. Impar-
tialism denudes her epistemic basis of her partialist evidence, leaving 
her with evidence largely unaffected by her reliable bias. We may sup-
pose that this evidence includes some sound arguments for p, but that it 
also contains some impressive (though ultimately unsound) arguments 
against p. Impartialism makes it very hard for Frieda to dismiss the latter 
and continue believing that p on the basis of the former. One reason is that 
Frieda, stripped of the background perspective supplied by her partialist 
evidence, is not in a position to have an impartialist-sanctioned belief that 
the arguments against p may have flaws that she cannot yet detect. An-
other reason is that a salient piece of impartialist evidence is the fact that 
many intelligent people (including Fred) assess the same arguments dif-
ferently than she does. Indeed, impartialism makes it difficult to dismiss 
people you disagree with as not being your epistemic peer. For although 
question-begging notions of peerhood are inadmissible, impartialist no-
tions of peerhood are admissible, such as the notion of a peer as anyone 
equally likely to have a justified belief about religion.65 If Fred is Frieda’s 
peer (to say nothing of her epistemic “superior”), her disagreement with 
him will be an obstacle to evidence-proportioned belief that p.66 And even 
if Fred is not her peer or “superior,” Frieda is likely to know that other 
people are.67
Moreover, many responses to the disagreement of a peer (or a “supe-
rior”) are closed to Frieda on impartialism. She cannot avail herself of 
the testimony of scholars in her belief community, at least not without 
a non-question-begging argument that their epistemic credentials are 
better than disagreeing scholars’. Nor can she posit tie-breaking “incom-
municable insights” into p-favoring arguments, for such insights are not 
intersubjectively available.68 We need not go as far as to claim that the evi-
dence of disagreement outweighs Frieda’s sound arguments for p (let alone 
64Swinburne (Existence of God) argues for instance that impartialist evidence alone yields 
a probability assignment to theism of ½.
65Lackey, “Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously.”
66Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.”
67Impartialism is thus at home with a “conciliationist” approach to peer disagreement like 
that of Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” or Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagree-
ment.”
68van Inwagen, “It Is Wrong,” 138.
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trumps them69) in order to see that, together with the arguments against p, 
it significantly weakens the confidence in p that Frieda, on impartialism, 
can enjoy.
Impartialists might argue that, although Frieda cannot use her religious 
experiences themselves as evidence (recall from section V), she can use 
certain beliefs about their occurrence, which might suffice for firm belief 
that p. But even though such beliefs count as impartialist evidence, impar-
tialism makes firm belief on their basis very difficult. For the most salient 
sorts of inference in which they feature are probabilistic: religious experi-
ences are regarded as a phenomenon to predict, where the hypothesis that 
predicts them the most strongly wins out, barring non-question-begging 
reasons to assign a higher prior probability to competing hypotheses.70 
Frieda’s challenge would be either to supply non-question-begging rea-
sons to prefer religious hypotheses a priori over naturalistic ones,71 or to 
argue in a non-question-begging way that the former have a predictive 
edge.72 These tasks are rendered especially difficult by the counterevi-
dence supplied by the fact that experiences across religions often have 
incompatible content or character.73 So beliefs about the occurrence of re-
ligious experiences, on impartialism, will not typically justify firm beliefs 
about religion.
A symmetrical point holds for the unreliably biased Fred. Just as impar-
tialism muffles Frieda’s reliable biases and pulls her away from true belief 
and toward agnosticism, it muffles Fred’s unreliable ones and pulls him 
toward agnosticism too. However, the state that it pulls Fred away from 
is false belief. This means that, whereas impartialism worsens Frieda’s 
epistemic situation, it improves Fred’s, for agnosticism is better than false 
belief. Be that as it may, however, impartialism is a flawed tool for pro-
moting the resolution of Frieda and Fred’s religious disagreement. Mutual 
agnosticism is far from our stated epistemic aim of resolution on a true 
belief about religion.74
The impartialist might respond that this is the best we can do, given 
the deeply controversial nature of religion—indeed, agreement that the 
evidence is inconclusive is at least resolution about something. The im-
partialist has a point here. But whether this outcome is the best on offer 
depends on how the other two policies compare.
69See Kelly, “Peer Disagreement.”
70Martin, Atheism, ch. 6; Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 160–161.
71Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 160–161. 
72Moser (Elusive God, 102–105) argues that theism predicts religious experiences, but 
does not discuss whether it does so more strongly than a promising naturalistic hypotheses 
would.
73Philipse, God in the Age of Science?, 14–15; Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 169.
74Impartialism does not entail mutual agnosticism, however; cf. Thurow, “Does Religious 
Disagreement Aid Theism?”
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VI.2. Partialism
Partialism’s stated aim is not to resolve disagreements. Rather, it is to 
epistemically safeguard any true beliefs about religion that people might 
already hold.75 If your biases about religion are reliable, then weighting 
partialist evidence heavily will tend to yield strong confidence in a true 
belief about religion. It will thus come as no surprise that partialism not 
only fails to promote resolution, but actively impedes it. This is what I’ll 
argue, but I will show too that this fact also reduces partialism’s effective-
ness in meeting its own aim of safeguarding true beliefs about religion.
Partialism impedes resolution because it promotes epistemic entrench-
ment. The confident beliefs about religion that it licenses will further 
strengthen Frieda’s (reliable) biases and thus also the force of her error 
theories and other partialist evidence. Lacking a requirement to give 
much weight to her impartialist evidence (including evidence against her 
confident belief), she will have little epistemic reason to pay it much heed, 
unless it favors her belief. This includes the impartialist evidence of her 
disagreement with Fred, as well as any counterarguments that he might 
supply. Resolution is further stymied by the fact that the unreliably biased 
Fred is in a symmetrical position. There is nothing to curtail, and every-
thing to motivate, his ever deeper entrenchment in his false beliefs about 
religion. Entrenched interlocutors are unlikely to resolve a disagreement.
Partialists will object that their view, being permissive, does not force 
agents to weight their evidence in ways that lead to entrenchment; those 
who desire can weight it in more resolution-friendly ways. But recall 
that there are other incentives toward entrenchment: apparent threats 
to worldview beliefs create unpleasant, even frightening, cognitive dis-
sonance (section III).76 So if we are permitted to weight evidence in a way 
that buttresses our beliefs about religion, we will tend to do so. Consider 
an analogy: a child who is allowed to have chocolate for dinner is unlikely 
to have anything else.77
Partialists might object further that peer disagreement lessens the risk 
of entrenchment. There are some senses of peerhood on which Frieda and 
Fred, even on partialism, can count as epistemic peers, such as Lackey’s 
sense of being equally likely to be epistemically justified.78 And will not 
evidence of peer disagreement modulate their entrenchment and promote 
75Plantinga for instance says that natural theology, though maybe useful to help nonbe-
lievers arrive at Christian faith, “is not of great importance for my project . . . [which] was to 
show how it could be that Christian belief might have warrant” (Warranted Christian Belief, 
220). But Christian belief has warrant only if produced by a cognitive faculty designed by 
God (Warranted Christian Belief, ch. 7), which it can only be if one’s Christian worldview is 
largely true already; cf. Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 67–69.
76Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski, “Terror Management Theory.”
77Of course, just as the child might revise this policy given enough indigestion, an en-
trenched agent might abandon partialism on finding that her beliefs about religion do not 
“work” very well. But due to the psychological importance of religious worldviews and their 
role as perceptual “lenses” (see sections II and III), it will take much to unseat them.
78Lackey, “Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously.”
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resolution? It could, but it need not. For recall (from section IV) that the 
belief that someone is your peer is itself impartialist evidence. On par-
tialism, it need not receive significant weight.79
Not only is the licensing of epistemic entrenchment not conducive to 
resolving religious disagreements, it hampers partialism’s own aim of 
supporting true religious beliefs. We may grant that partialism can license 
true religious beliefs that one has already formed, but it also makes truly 
believing agents susceptible to forming additional, false, beliefs. Unless 
the biases of an agent like Frieda are perfectly reliable (which is statistically 
highly improbable), entrenchment is an epistemic minefield for her. For 
even if many of her general convictions about religion are true, she will 
be susceptible to false-positive beliefs about particulars (see section II). 
Suppose for example that atheism is true and that Frieda is an atheist. She 
will likely incline toward the (we’ll suppose) false beliefs that this theist 
interlocutor won’t have insightful objections to atheism, or that conflicting 
statements in religious texts make those texts flat-out contradictory, 
without regard to historical context or literary genre. A modicum of chal-
lenge from a disagreeing interlocutor, or from impartialist evidence (such 
as the fact that false-positive beliefs are a real danger), could lessen this 
risk, but partialism absolves agents of the need to weight such evidence 
heavily. Taking resolution more seriously as an epistemic aim, I suggest, 
could help achieve partialism’s stated goal, upholding true religious be-
liefs, more effectively.
Let’s return to the unreliably biased agent, Fred. Partialism’s aim of up-
holding true religious beliefs for those who already have them does not 
even pretend to an interest in his epistemic welfare.80 Indeed, partialism 
even licenses Fred in a false sense of security: as far as he is concerned, 
in weighting his partialist evidence heavily, he has done all that episte-
mology requires. The way in which partialism tries to achieve its stated 
goal, then, is not only inimical to resolution but has an outworking that 
might even be described as epistemically elitist: it makes the unreliably 
biased Fred a casualty of the epistemic entitlement accorded to the reli-
ably biased Frieda.
Partialists might respond that Plantinga’s version of partialism contains 
the tools to lessen the risk of entrenchment.81 He requires agents to deal 
with any impartialist counterevidence (i.e., defeaters) that they come 
across; surely this will keep agents like Fred from being too confident in 
falsehoods and agents like Frieda from getting carried away with false-
positives. But this suggestion does not help. Partialism lets agents give 
their partialist evidence more weight than their impartialist evidence; a 
79Partialism thus sits naturally with a “steadfast” approach to peer disagreement along 
the lines of Kelly, “Epistemic Significance.”
80Baker, “Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology,” surveys similar critiques of Plantinga’s 
partialism; for a more general discussion, cf. Goldberg, “Does Externalist Epistemology Ra-
tionalize Religious Commitment?”
81Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 341.
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fortiori it lets them give their question-begging prior beliefs more weight 
than their counterevidence.82 We can see this in a case that Plantinga 
describes of an agent confronted with impartialist counterevidence. She 
implements partialism by giving heavy weight to a type of partialist 
evidence that Plantinga calls “doxastic experience,” which amounts to a 
phenomenal sense of conviction. Because this agent has a “powerful in-
clination to believe [the great truths of the Gospel] and hence has strong 
doxastic evidence [i.e., doxastic experience] for them,” her religious beliefs 
“remain thus convincing even after she has considered the objections she 
has encountered.” So she keeps them as before.83 Plantinga’s requirement 
to address defeaters has not made this believer less entrenched.
Partialists might also respond, in the spirit of Alston, that the right dox-
astic practice can at least keep agents like Frieda from forming too many 
false-positive beliefs.84 I concur that effective doxastic practices do this 
sort of thing—indeed, it is at least conceivable that some practices are so 
sophisticated that they nearly always distinguish reliable from unreliable 
partialist evidence. Yet such doxastic practices are statistically very un-
likely. The sheer variety of incompatible belief systems indicates that most 
doxastic practices have error-prone spots.85 Answerability to impartialist 
evidence provides a natural safeguard. Moreover, even if some doxastic 
practice is perfect, this does not compensate for the many deeply flawed 
practices that partialism licenses alongside it.
In summary, partialism—and its disinterest in resolution—has impor-
tant epistemic costs for everyone: the unreliably biased believer who is 
likely to wind up entrenched in false beliefs, the reliably biased believer 
likely to be riddled with false-positive beliefs, and the community as a 
whole, which will squander the epistemic opportunity furnished by the 
disagreement of its members. Partialism is not the evidence-weighting 
policy we need if we are interested in resolution, but nor is it the policy for 
upholding true beliefs about religion more generally.
VI.3. Egalitarianism
We have seen that each kind of evidence has benefits and liabilities. Par-
tialist evidence can be a unique vehicle for reliable biases, but also for 
unreliable biases and false-positive beliefs. Impartialist evidence can 
temper these effects, but it also stifles reliable biases. Whereas impar-
tialism and partialism both opt for a plus and a minus, egalitarianism tries 
to hold them in balance.
82Similarly, Gellman, “Contented Religious Exclusivism,” argues that it is epistemically 
acceptable to evaluate counterevidence in terms of your religious framework, as long as you 
“rationally [possess] the requisite confidence in” that framework (404), where rationality 
amounts to minimalist adherence to “procedures of reasoning such as deduction and induc-
tion” (414).
83Warranted Christian Belief, 203–204.
84Alston, Perceiving God.
85Fales, “Critical Notice,” 362; Schellenberg, The Wisdom to Doubt, 169.
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As a result, egalitarianism tends to land our disagreeing agents, Frieda 
and Fred, squarely in between the place where the other two policies land 
them. We saw that impartialism tends to push their beliefs away from 
the poles of truth and falsehood and toward agnosticism, inhibiting the 
true belief aspect of resolution; and we saw that partialism lets them drift 
toward those poles, inhibiting the agreement aspect. Egalitarianism, by 
contrast, tends to land agents somewhere in between, with moderately con-
fident beliefs—Frieda in a truth and Fred in a falsehood. I’ll argue that this 
result promotes the resolution of religious disagreements more effectively 
than either of the other policies.
Egalitarianism is clearly better than partialism in this regard. Moderate 
confidence in opposing beliefs leaves much more room for open-minded 
discussion than does entrenchment. On partialism, error theories can 
easily become discrediting mechanisms; this result is much less likely on 
egalitarianism, which holds agents strongly responsible to impartialist 
evidence.
However, it may be less evident that egalitarianism promotes resolu-
tion more effectively than does impartialism. Granted, impartialism has 
the disadvantage of making mutual true belief, as opposed to agnosti-
cism, hard to attain. But egalitarianism seems to have the disadvantage 
of fostering continued disagreement (albeit not in as polarizing a fashion 
as partialism). For egalitarianism, in mandating that partialist evidence 
receive roughly equal weight, still allows agents significant scope to apply 
question-begging error theories to their interlocutors. Should the inter-
locutors be epistemic peers, egalitarianism tempers the weight that this 
piece of impartialist evidence needs to receive.86
Yet egalitarianism nevertheless does promote resolution more effec-
tively than impartialism. Moreover, it does so precisely because it requires a 
measure of evidential weight to be given to partialist evidence, error theo-
ries notwithstanding. To see this, note that, although partialist evidence 
is more likely to be unreliably biased than impartialist evidence, it is also 
more likely to reveal aspects of reality that are unavailable on impartialist 
evidence alone. For human cognition is perspectival, and perspectives can 
complement and correct each other. We saw that differently biased people 
will have different experiences. First, they will attend to different aspects 
of the same situation: a policewoman on a street will notice suspicious 
people and objects, whereas an enthusiastic father will notice children and 
toy stores. Second, two people may perceive the same object differently: 
whereas you perceive my brother’s facial expression as angry, I (who 
know him better) perceive it as ironic. Comparing perspectives will teach 
you that my brother is in fact being ironic, and it will teach me that his 
irony can come across as anger. Egalitarianism’s requirement to give par-
tialist evidence significant weight capitalizes on the perspectival nature 
86Egalitarianism is thus at home with a middle-ground view of the epistemology of peer 
disagreement, like that of Lackey, “Justificationist View,” or Kelly, “Higher-Order Evidence.”
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of human cognition, while its requirement to give just as much weight to 
impartialist evidence maintains sight of a common reality.
Impartialism, by contrast, strives to eliminate all perspective from our 
evidence. It does so ostensibly in the service of mind-independent reality, 
but in fact at the expense of the aspects of reality that differently biased 
people can uniquely pick up on. Impartialism denudes each person’s per-
spective of the aspects that may correct or complement the other’s.
Let’s return to Frieda and Fred. Should they choose to engage with each 
other, their situation on egalitarianism has much more epistemic potential 
than on impartialism. Consider Frieda. Egalitarianism, over and above 
leaving her with enough partialist evidence to maintain a moderately con-
fident true belief, gives her a moderately confident interlocutor, Fred, with 
his own solid perspective from which to highlight flaws in her reasoning 
and challenge her to support her beliefs better. Now consider Fred. Even 
though egalitarianism leaves him with moderate confidence in a false-
hood, it nonetheless puts him in a good position to advance from there. 
He need only discuss matters open-mindedly with Frieda.
But the impartialist will remind us of her objection: will not Frieda and 
Fred’s discussion be hampered, on egalitarianism, by their continued ad-
herence to their respective error theories, which impartialism does away 
with entirely? I do not think so. For if the agents have enough impartialist 
evidence (including, if applicable, the evidence that their interlocutor is an 
epistemic peer), they may be moderately confident that their error theories 
apply to their interlocutors—but their impartialist evidence should pre-
vent them from discounting their interlocutor’s views a priori. How will 
it do this? Assuming that there is no impartialist reason to epistemically 
downgrade each other, Frieda’s and Fred’s respective impartialist evidence 
is likely to nudge each to take the other’s perspective seriously. Indeed, 
one important piece of impartialist evidence that a person engaging in 
disagreement is likely to have is the belief that different perspectives can 
complement and correct each other.
Egalitarianism, then, strikes the epistemic Goldilocks spot: neither too 
hot nor too cold, but just right. Impartialism compels an epistemically im-
poverished a-perspectivalism that stymies progress toward the truth, and 
partialism legitimates closed-minded entrenchment. Egalitarianism, by 
contrast, affirms the epistemic importance of perspectives while holding 
different perspectives accountable both to each other and to inter-perspec-
tival considerations that anchor them in a common reality.
VI.4. Objections and Remaining Questions
One might object that, although the above results hold in disagreements 
between two views, they do not apply when the menu of incompatible 
beliefs is larger. Consider a disagreement arising among five different 
viewpoints; these might include, for example, forms of exclusivist mono-
theism, non-monotheistic forms of supernaturalism, secular naturalism, 
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or Hick-style pluralism. The objector will sketch the following picture of 
the way in which the three policies fare on this scenario.87
Impartialism, she will say, plausibly nudges interlocutors toward 
a level of confidence of around 20 percent in each of the five alterna-
tives (supposing that none of the views is knocked out by impartialist 
evidence). And this is a far cry from the 50 percent confidence yielded 
by the two-alternative case: whereas 50 percent confidence can be classed 
as agnosticism, 20 percent looks like disbelief. For partialism, by contrast, 
a larger number of alternatives changes little. You can still weight your 
partialist evidence as you please, and so may wind up with a confidence 
level of around 90 percent, perhaps higher. What about egalitarianism? 
Because this policy nudges interlocutors toward a confidence falling 
between that sanctioned by the other two views, it would tend here to 
yield a confidence of roughly 55 percent (taking the average confidence 
yielded by the other views). The objector will say that this is a far cry from 
the moderate confidence that egalitarianism yields in the two-alternative 
case. Indeed, it looks more like agnosticism or at best very weak belief. 
The upshot seems to be that, on the multiple-alternative scenario, only 
partialism can hope to reliably yield true belief, let alone anything even 
close to moderate confidence in a truth. Impartialism yields disbelief and 
egalitarianism something like agnosticism.88
However, matters are not as dire for egalitarianism or impartialism 
as they may appear. For argument’s sake let us grant the objector the re-
spective levels of confidence yielded by each of the policies. It does not 
follow that impartialism yields disbelief and egalitarianism something 
like agnosticism. These claims would only follow if 50 percent confidence 
were always the minimum threshold for belief. But when a plurality of 
options is on the table, belief can be compatible with less than 50 percent 
confidence, for belief is contrastive: whether you count as believing that p 
depends not only on how confident you are that p, but also on how con-
fident you are in the alternatives to p. Swinburne illustrates this point by 
imagining a discussion of which team will win the FA Cup. The contestants 
include Liverpool, Manchester United, Leeds, and so forth. The subject S 
believes that Liverpool is more likely to win than the other teams, but his 
confidence that it will win is less than 50 percent. “If we asked S ‘Who do 
you believe will win the Cup?’,” Swinburne says, “he would surely not be 
lying if he said ‘Liverpool’ rather than ‘I do not believe of any particular 
team that it will win.’”89
If this is so, then someone who is more confident in one religious out-
look than in each of a number of others, even if her confidence is less than 
87Thanks to an anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy.
88Talk of levels of confidence can be cashed out in probabilistic terms; I am not working 
in probabilistic terms here simply because I want to avoid the assumption that the agents in 
question meet ideal probabilistic standards.
89Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 6.
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50 percent, can count as believing that outlook. Moreover, if her confidence 
in it exceeds her confidence in other outlooks by some non-negligible 
amount, she may count as being moderately confident in it—and this is 
analogous to the egalitarian result in the two-alternatives case. (We may 
make a similar point for impartialism: on a multi-alternative setup, an 
approximately even distribution of confidence can plausibly count as 
agnosticism rather than as disbelief in every option.) Perhaps relative con-
fidence is not as psychologically satisfying as confidence simpliciter, and 
it may not be held in comparably high esteem by religious traditions that 
construe confident belief as a virtue. But from an epistemological stand-
point it can be a perfectly acceptable form of belief, and it can achieve the 
same kind of result in the multiple-alternative case as confidence simplic-
iter does in the two-alternative case: it gives you a definite perspective, yet 
without licensing entrenchment.
A final question is whether and how egalitarianism and the other 
policies can be modeled formally. One salient issue concerns whether, to 
yield the sorts of result I have mooted, the policies can be modeled as re-
specting conditionalization. I do not have the space to discuss this here. 
But one thing that I can say is that, if they are to be modeled as respecting 
conditionalization, we would need to supplement them with additional 
assumptions. For a formal, in particular a probabilistic, model would likely 
need constraints on the initial probability of the proposition under consid-
eration—that is, on its probability prior to the receipt of any evidence. The 
policies as presented informally here, by contrast, are silent on initial prob-
ability; they concern only the role of evidence. So the formal modeling of 
these policies is an important step for future research. I hope here to have 
established some important principles and priorities to guide it.
VII. Conclusion
Bias is an important factor to negotiate in promoting the resolution of re-
ligious disagreements. One reason is that bias affects not only the content 
of our evidence (the first natural go-to in resolving a disagreement) but 
also the ways in which we incline to weight it. An additional complication 
is that, although many biases are epistemically unreliable (though they 
may accomplish their practical function), many others are epistemically 
reliable, though still apt to facilitate false-positive beliefs.
The three evidence-weighting policies in the philosophy of religion 
differ over their response to bias. Impartialism, by ascribing the most 
weight to impartialist evidence, aims to expunge it entirely. Partialism, 
by allowing agents to ascribe overweening weight to partialist evidence, 
aims to capitalize on reliable biases for those lucky enough to have them. 
I have argued, by contrast, that both impartialist and partialist evidence 
play important roles. Impartialist evidence holds agents accountable 
to a common reality, whereas partialist evidence reveals aspects of that 
reality to some that may be hidden from others. But both kinds of evi-
dence also have drawbacks: impartialist evidence is blind to important 
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perspectival information, and partialist evidence facilitates exaggerated 
confirmation biases.
The answer is an evidence-weighting policy that values both types of 
evidence while mandating that they be held accountable to each other. 
That evidence-weighting policy is egalitarianism—at least, as long as what 
we are aiming for is “good disagreement,” in the sense of a disagreement 
that lends itself to resolution on a true belief about religion.90
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